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INDICTMENT BY A GRAND JURY
INDICTMENT BY A GRAND JURY
By H. L. MCCLINTOCK*
T HE wide-spread concern felt by the public during the decade
following the first World War over the defects in the admini-
stration of the criminal law, a concern which resulted in the
numerous crime surveys of that period, was due largely to the
fear that organized crime might prove to be beyond the power
of the government to control. Before the results of the surveys,
and of other studies in judicial control of crime, could be largely
perpetuated in statutory reforms, the fear was to a great degree
allayed by the success of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in
breaking up organized crime on a large scale; and public attention
was diverted from the subject by the economic depression of the
thirties and by the present international threat to our security.
But the very fact that the subject no longer attracts much public
attention makes it a favorable time to study the question more
objectively, and the example of the federal government in corn-
miting the task of reform of criminal procedure to the courts'
give greater assurance that such study may be more productive of
results than were those undertaken when there was more interest
in them on the part of the public as a whole. At the same time,
courts and lawyers should be keenly aware that the importance
of reform of criminal procedure is just as great as ever. The
efforts of the government to protect itself against disloyal conduct
during the war will require the best machinery that it is possible
to devise to make possible the conviction of the guilt)' and at the
same time to protect the many innocent who will find themselves
under unjust suspicion. Also we may anticipate that history will
repeat itself, and that the termination of the war may lead in the
period of readjustment to a great increase in organized criminal
activity which will again put a severe strain upon our law en-
forcing agencies.
One of the features of our criminal procedure that is very
frequently attacked by its critics is the strictness with which the
technical rules as to the sufficiency of indictments have been en-
*Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
'Supreme Court Order of Feb. 3, 1941, 61 Sup. Ct. Rep. XIII. pursuant
to Act June 29, 1940, 28 U. S. C. sec. 723a.
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forced. Sir Matthew Hale's statement in the History of the Pleas
of the Crown,-
2
"That in favour of life great strictnesses have been in all
times required in points of indictments, and tile truth is, that it is
grown to be a blemish and inconvenience in the law, and tile
administration thereof; more offenders escape by the over easy
ear given to exceptions in indictments, than by their own in-
nocence, and many times gross murders, burglaries, robberies, and
other heinous and crying offenses, escape by these unseemly
niceties to the reproach of the law, to the shame of the govern-
ment, and to the encouragement of villainy, and to the dishonour
of God"
has been frequently quoted or expressed in more modern phrase
by many recent writers.' We have no means of verifying the ac-
curacy of the statement of Hale, and even in our (lay statistics
as to the results of criminal prosecutions are so fragmentary that
no definite conclusions can be based upon them, but the frag-
mentary facts we do have indicate that the number of guilty
persons who escape punishment because of technical rulings as
to the sufficiency of indictments is far less than is generally sup-
posed. Thus in the American Law Institute's Study of the Busi-
ness of the Federal Courts,4 it appears that in the 34,420 cases
studied, "pleadings"" were filed by defendants in only 1,857, and
of the 2,965 pleadings filed only 403, or 13.2 per cent, were mo-
tions to quash the indictment or information and 130, or 4.4 per
cent, were motions in arrest of judgment, which we may assume
were based in many, if not most, of the cases on some claimed
defect in the indictment or information. On 1,530. or 51.6 per
cent of these pleadings, the ruling was in favor of the United
States, and on only 827, or 28 per cent of the pleadings, was the
ruling in favor of the defendant. The other pleadings are ac-
counted for under the headings "No entry" or "Other rulings."
The study sustains the conclusion that in only a fraction of one
per cent of the criminal cases in the federal courts is the indict-
ment held to be defective,G and this small fraction undoubtedly
2Hale. History of the Pleas of the Crown (1st Am. Ed., 1847) 193. Sir
Matthew Hale died in 1676, and his work was published thereafter.
•Among many that might be cited are Caruso, The Short Indictment,
(1935) 23 Ky. L. J. 362; Perkins, Short Indictments and Informations.
(1929) 15 A. B. A. 3. 292.
4The American Law Institute, A Study of the Business of the Federal
Courts (1934) Part I, Criminal Cases, p. 72, and Detailed Tables 15. p. 127
and 17, p. 129.
5The term is used to include any motion or paper filed in the case except
a guilty or not guilty plea.
"Comment. (1937) 35 Mich. Law Rev. 456.
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includes many cases where the defect was one of substance and
not merely of form.
The survey of criminal prosecutions in selected groups of
counties in Illinois7 led to the conclusion that
"The cases eliminated by discharges by the court, presum-
ably for defective indictments or failure to bring the case to
trial within the time required by the statute, were negligible in
all of the Illinois groups, except in the seven semi-urban counties,
where it reaches 0.93 per cent."
In the supreme courts 59 per cent of the cases appealed were
affirmed. Of the reversals, only 4.6 per cent were for defective
indictment or information. In Missouri, out of 4,969 cases lodged
in the circuit court, only 251 were disposed of by action of the
court, and of these only 16 were discharged on motion to quash0
In the supreme court of that state, of 329 reversals in 745 cases
studied, only 28 were for defective indictment. 1 In this connec-
tion, it should be remembered that some of the decisions over-
turning indictments and informations which have been most
severely criticized as over-technical, have come from Missouri.'
If these three jurisdictions are not entirely out of line with
the rest of the country, it would appear that the elimination of
all cases where indictments or informations were held defective
would have only a negligible effect on the percentage of convic-
tions of criminals. But that does not indicate that a reformation of
criminal procedure which would accomplish that result would not
be worth while, for the widespread criticism of these cases in
both legal and lay discussions of the problem of enforcement of
the criminal law shows that the rulings on the sufficiency of the
accusation, especially those which are made in the appellate court
after the conviction of the accused, occupy a very prominent posi-
tion in the "show window of the bar,"1" and a procedural system
which would satisfy the public that such rulings fully accorded
with the policy behind the criminal lav. would go far toward re-
7Illinois Crime Survey (1929) 211.
Slllinois Crime Survey (1929) 117.9Mfissouri Crime Survey (1926) 167.
xo'
0 issouri Crime Survey (1926) 223.
"iSee discussion of the Missouri opinions on sufficiency of indictments
in Missouri Crime Survey (1926) 234-253. Caruso, The Short Indictment,
(1935) 23 Ky. L. J. 362, 369, 370 lists as one of three "famous" cases for
technical rulings on indictments State v. Campbell, (1908) 210 Mo. -02. 109
S. W. 807 reversing a conviction for rape on the ground that the indictment
concluded "against the peace and dignity of state," instead of "Against the
peace and dignity of the state" as required by a clause in the constitution.
'12 Stassen, The Show Window of the Bar, (1936) 20 MfiNx-soTA Iow
REvimw 577.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
storing the prestige of the' courts in the administration of criminal
justice.
Traditionally in our law, an accusation of felony must be
made by a presentment or an indictment" by a grand jury.
Although the grand jury originated as a royal device to extract
information from the people of a locality concerning matters of
interest to the crown,'14 it had become by the time of the revolts
against the Stuart kings an instrument for the protection of the
subject against arbitrary accusations by the crown, and it was
this function of the grand jury that the framers of the constitu-
tions of most of the original states had in mind when they inserted
in those documents provisions for the commencement of felony
prosecutions only by indictment of the grand jury, and which
led to the insistence on the adoption of the provision of the fifth
amendment to the federal constitution that
"No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or other-
wise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or
in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public
danger.""
This provision is still part of the federal constitution, and similar
provisions with more or less extensive exceptions are to be found
in most of the state constitutions, though a number of them have
no requirement for a grand jury and others permit the system
to be regulated or abolished by statute."; Wide differences of
oinion 7 exist as to the value of the grand jury system in our
13A presentment was a charge made by the grand jury on their own
initiative, whereas an indictment was brought before them by the prosecutin,
officer or some other competent party and was voted by them a "true bill.'
Though both terms are retained in some of our constitutions and statutes,
there appears to be no distinction between them today, and this article will
follow the usual practice of modern courts to use the term "indictments"
to include all accusations of crime preferred in court by a grand jury.
142 Pollock & Maitland, History of English Law (2d Ed. 1898) 641,
649: 1 Stephen, History of Criminal Law (1883) 252-254; Note, (1929)
24 Il1. L. Rev. 319, 320.
''United States constitution, amendment V. By Amendment VI accused
is entitled "to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation." It is
doubtful whether this requires anything more than would be required by
due process, but in any event, no proposed reform of procedure should in-
fringe this right, so no particular discussion of it is called for.
-oAmerican Law Institute. Code of Criminal Procedure (1930) Com.
mentary to sec. 113, pp. 414-431.
'
7 For a discussion of the various arguments for and against the sub-
stitution of information by the prosecuting attorney for indictment by the
grand jury, written by one who favored the substitution, see Miller, Informa-
tions or Indictments in Felony Cases, (1924) 8 MINNESOTA LAw REri:v
379. A discussion of this problem is beyond the scope of the present article,
but many of the proposals for reform of indictments herein discussed could
be applied to informations as well.
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modern criminal procedure, but in most of tile jurisdictions where
it is still retained there does not seem to be enough public opposi-
tion to it to make its abolition possible; and at this time, when
rights of individuals have been completely subordinated to the
will of the executive in many countries, and when fears are ex-
pressed in our own country that the expansion of the executive
power is endangering the rights of the individual, it would be
the height of folly to make any attempt to eliminate it so long
as any substantial part of the people continue to regard it as a
bulwark against executive tyranny. Our concern now is to investi-
gate what reforms in the system are constitutionally possible, and
desirable.
In considering the interpretation to be placed on the guaranty
of indictment by grand jury in the fifth amendment to the federal
constitution, it is interesting to speculate on what would have been
the intent of the framers of that amendment with respect to the
simplification of the common law indictment with which they
were familiar, and which they undoubtedly had in mind when
they drafted the amendment. The amendment, with the others
making up the federal bill of rights, was demanded by those
who feared the power of the federal government created by the
proposed constitution, and was insisted upon as a condition to
the ratification of that instrument in many of the states. We may
reasonably suppose that they would have insisted on the retention
of the form of the indictment as they knew it, since they were
more concerned with the protection of the individual than with
the efficient operation of the government. Other groups in the
country who might be expected to be more concerned with the
protection of the social order against its enemies, were conserva-
tive by instinct and still adhered to many of the old forms. It is,
therefore, probable that when it was adopted, the amendment
was regarded by everyone as referring to the strict technical
indictment of the common law.
But such speculation is of only academic interest, for the
legislatures began at an early date to pass statutes which dealt
with the worst abuses of the common law rules respecting the
validity of the indictment, and such laws are now to be found
in every state' and in the acts of Congress. 9 In so far as those
statutes by their express terms, or by the construction placed
'SAmerican Law Institute, Code of Criminal Procedure (1930) Com-
mentary to secs. 154, 155, pp. 543-550.
1918 U. S. Code, sec. 556.
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upon them by the courts, have been limited to merely formal parts
of the indictment, they have been held valid, or their validity
has been assumed. In the few cases in which statutes prescribing
the sufficiency of indictments have been held to violate the con-
stitutional guaranty of accusation by indictment, the courts have
considered that they permitted the omission of allegations sub-
stantially necessary to charge the crime. 20 We may, therefore,
safely assert that the settled construction of these constitutional
guaranties is that they permit modification in the form. but not
in substance, of the indictment as it was known at common law.
That makes necessary an examination of the functions per-
formed by the indictment to ascertain what are the essential
elements that must be retained.
Historical research has made it abundantly clear that in the
beginning the indictment performed only the function of in-
forming the king's officers of the crimes which had been com-
mitted in the jurisdiction from which the grand jury was called.
Normally a prosecution for a felony was still instituted by the
appeal of the person injured, but for various reasons, not the
least of them being the fact that the appellor had to maintain his
appeal by personal combat with the appellee, this normal process
was not proving effective in many cases, especially since the de-
velopment of the trespass actions was giving the injured persons
a remedy for redress of the wrongs done to them without sub-
jecting them to the risks of an appeal for felony. This limited
function of the indictment explains why, until a comparatively re-
cent period, the accused was not given a copy of the indictment,
or even permitted to read it, but had to get his knowledge of its
contents from hearing it read to him on his arraignment, a rule
entirely proper respecting an accusation for the benefit of the
king, but totally inconsistent with the later declared purpose of
the indictment to inform the defendant of the exact accusation
against him..2 1
Before the colonization of America, the indictment had be-
come, in addition to an accusation, the pleading of the prosecu-
tion. and was subjected to the strict construction that then applied
to all pleadings. The worst features of the strict rules when ap-
plied to civil proceedings were alleviated by the statutes of jeo-
2OState v. Learned, (1859) 47 Me. 426: State v. Mace. (1884) 76 Me
64; Murphy v. State, (1852) 24 Miss. 590: Williams v. State. (1882) 12
Tex. App. 396, Rodriguez v. State, (1882) 12 Tex. App. 552; Brinster
State, (1882) 12 Tex. App. 612.
213 Holdsworth, History of English Law (4th Ed. 1935) 607-623.
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fails, but these statutes did not apply to criminal procedure, so
that we adopted with the indictment the old rules of strict con-
struction.22
The last of the fundamental functions of an indictment, its
protection of the citizen against arbitrary action by the sovereign,
was inherent in the system from its origin, even though the pur-
pose of the creation of the system was entirely different. But this
function attained the importance in public estimation which led
to its guaranty in bills of rights during the struggle between the
popular party represented by parliament and the Stuarts. The
prosecuting officers, and, to only a slightly less extent, the judges,
were under the control of the crown, but so long as no prosecu-
tion could be begun unless a grand jury voted an indictment,
the subject had some protection against arbitrary prosecution, and
most of the colonists who settled America came from the op-
ponents of the crown to whom this protection was so important.!
It is reasonable, therefore, to conclude that the guaranty of
indictment by a grand jury was intended to preserve the existing
functions of the indictment as a pleading and as an accusation
by a non-official body, based on an adjudication by that body that
the accused was guilt, of the specific crime for which he was to
be placed on trial, and that the second of these functions was re-
garded as of much greater importance. But neither of these func-
tions can be substantially impaired by statute or court rule without
violating the bill of rights.
At common lav, a first pleading by the instigator of the
proceeding, whether civil or criminal, to be good must satisfy
three requirements. First of all it must allege enough facts to
show that the court in which the proceeding is brought has juris-
diction of the subject matter and to enable it to render the proper
judgment; in a criminal case, it must show that the acts which
defendant is charged with committing amounted to a specified
crime which the court had power to punish, and that it was
committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. In the
second place, the-pleading must inform the defendant of the na-
ture of the charge against him. In the third place, it must form
a record from which it can be determined whether a subsequent
proceeding is barred by the former adjudication. The common
law indictment satisfied the first of these requirements. even
224 Holdsworth, History of English Law (2d Ed. 1937) 531.
2Ex Darte Bain, (1887) 121 U. S. 1, 7 Sup. Ct. 781, 30 L. Ed. 849:
Note. (1929) 24 Ill. L: Rev. 319.
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though it wasted a good many words in doing so. No judge with
even the minimum of training would fail to recognize the nature
of the crime charged, and the indictment was required specifically
to allege the county in which the act had been committed. In the
seventeenth century, during which Hale wrote, there was an almost
complete failure to meet the second requirement. When defendant
was not furnished with a copy of the indictment and was not rep-
resented by counsel, he got very little information as to the na-
ture of the accusation against him from hearing read a lengthy
document which not only was bristling with technical legal terms,
but was also all in Latin. Furthermore, the indictment might be
actually misleading in some respects. It was required to state the
day on which the alleged crime was committed, but a conviction
could be sustained if the proof showed another (lay, so long as
the prosecution was not barred.2 4 So an indictment for homicide
must allege the weapon used, but accused might be convicted
though the evidence showed that he used a different weapon.21
Even today, when the indictment is in English and the accused is
furnished with a copy of it, he may still, unless aided by counsel,
be unable to understand its meaning. It is not unknown in our
modern criminal courts to have defendants ask, after the read-
ing of the indictment, what it means, and to be able to under-
stand perfectly when told it charges that he murdered, or as-
saulted with intent to murder, John Doe. We also permit con-
victions where there is a variance between allegations which we
say must be included in the indictment so that it will inform
accused of the nature of the charge against him and thereby en-
able him to prepare his defense, and the proof adduced by the
prosecution.
26
The third requirement, that the record protect against a sec-
ond prosecution, is probably met by the indictment in the great
majority of cases, but in most of those cases there is no danger
of a second prosecution for the same offense. In those cases where
there is such danger, those where there is a question whether
several acts of the defendant constitute a single crime, or more
than one, or whether one act amounts to several crimes, the rec-
ord is generally not sufficient to determine the question, and de-
fendant must allege facts outside of the record to support his
plea of former conviction or former acquittal. Indeed, the restric-
242 Hale, History of Pleas of the Crown (1st Am. Ed., 1847) 179.
252 Hale, History of Pleas of the Crown (1st Am. Ed., 1847) 185.
2631 C. J. 841 and cases cited in n. 4.
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tion that the indictment must allege but a single offense, has led
some courts often to nullify the protection against double jeopardy
by determining whether the offenses for which accused is being
prosecuted are the same by the test of whether there could have
been a conviction of the present offense under the indictment in
the preceding case-which generally results in a decision that the
two are separate.
2 7
So far the legislatures have seldom attempted to restrict the
function of the indictment as an adjudication by the grand jury
that defendant is probably guilty of a particular offense for
which he should be prosecuted, and any attempt to do so should
be nullified by the courts. It may be true, as some studies have
suggested,28 that the grand jury in most cases acts as directed
by the prosecuting attorney, but it still has the power to go con-
trary to -his instructions, and probably would do so in any case
where public opinion felt that the executive power was undertak-
ing to crush opposition to it by baseless prosecution of its op-
ponents.
This analysis of the functions of indictment by the grand jury
suggests the standards for the criticism of past attempts to reform
the system, and of proposals for its further modification. In so far
as these reforms have been directed against the indictment it-
self, they have taken the form of either general provisions relax-
ing the strictness of the common law requirements, permitting
amendments to eliminate the freeing of defendants for errors in
the indictments, or broadening the common law%, rules as to the
defects that are wafived by failure to plead them expressly or
cured by the verdict; or else they have undertaken to provide
simplified forms which have been declared to be sufficient.
Reforms of the first mentioned type have achieved on the
whole a large measure of success. Generally their validity has
not been questioned,29 and when the question has been raised.
they have been uniformly sustained. They have failed to attain
complete success only because many courts have construed them
27Note, (1940) 24 'MINNESoTA LAw REVIEW 522, 546.28 orse, A Survey of the Grand Jury System, (1931) 10 Ore. L. Rev.
101.
29But see Ex parte Bain, (1887) 121 U. S. 1, 7 Sup. Ct. 781, 30 L. Ed.
849 holding that an amendment of an indictment by striking therefrom
matter which might be surplusage violated the constitutional guaranty
of indictment by a grand jury. No statute authorizing such amendment was
referred to. American Law Institute. Code of Criminal Procedure (1930)
Commentaries to sec. 184, p. 583 lists statutes from most of the states
permitting amendments of form, and it appears from 31 C. J. 825, nn. 60-64
that such statutes have been almost uniformly upheld.
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so narrowly as to nullify much of the good which their advocates
intended they should accomplish.3"
Legislative enactment of specific forms has not been so suc-
cessful. Where the court has found that the prescribed form fails
to allege some particular fact essential to the completion of the
crime, the form has been held invalid, either because it fails to
inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him,
or because it does not conform to the requirements of an indict-
ment as that term was used in the constitutional guaranty of in-
dictment by a grand jury.:, In a recent case32 the New York
court of appeals sustained an indictment which, as permitted by
statute, merely charged that defendants on a clay stated com-
mitted murder in the first degree contrary to a specified section of
the Penal Law, on the ground that the statute required the
prosecuting attorney, on demand by the defendant, to furnish a
bill of particulars which became part of the record, and such a
bill was furnished in this case. In affirming the conviction in
that case, the court said:
"Our decision that in this case the conviction must be sus-
tained where no claim is made that the charge in the indictment
of murder in the first degree could have been understood to have
any meaning other than a charge of the murder of Ferdinand
Fechter. may not be regarded as a judicial approval of the form
of the indictment used. It is sufficient here; it might prove in-
:"o"It is somewhat difficult to say what is form, and what is substance,
in an indictment. A nice critic might insist that form is substance in a
criminal pleading." Lowell, Cir. J.. in United States v. Jackson, (1). Mass.
1880) 2 Fed. 500, 502.31State v. Learned, (1859) 47 Me. 426 (statutory form charging pos-
session of liquor failed to allege it was possessed with intent to sell),
State v. Mace, (1884) 76 Me. 64 (statutory form for perjury did not
allege oath was authorized or required by law); Murphy v. State, (1852)
24 Miss. 590 (form charging barter with slave without consent of
master did not give name of slave or master, or specify article sold to
slave); Williams v. State, (1882) 12 Tex. App. 396 (indictment for larceny
in statutory form insufficient because failing to allege ownership of prop-
erty, lack of owner's consent and felonious intent of defendant), followed
as to same form of larceny indictment in Hodges v. State, (1882) 12 Tex.
App. 554: Young v. State, (1882) 12 Tex. App. 614: Insull v. State,
(1883) 14 Tex. App. 145. In Rodriquez v. State, (1882) 12 Tex. App.
552 the statutory form of indictment for burglary was held insufficient be-
cause it failed to allege the ingredients of the intended felony, simply
charging the entry was "with intent to steal." In Brinster v. State. (1882)
12 Tex. App. 612 an indictment charging that defendant, "all adult male,
did rape [M] a female" was held insufficient, the court saying: "An indict-
ment is a written statement of a grand jury, accusing a person therein
named of some act or omission punished by law." See Note, (1935) 13 Tex.
L. Rev. 101 on the validity of the short form of indictment under the Texas
constitution.32People v. Bogdanoff. (1930) 254 N. Y. 16, 171 N. E. 890; Note.
(1930) 30 Col. L. Rev. 1051.
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sufficient in any case where doubt as to its meaning could exist.
Whatever form is used, an indictment must still remain a written
accusation of a crime by the grand jury. Reasonably precise formu-
lation should render it unnecessary to resort to extraneous proof,
yet a faulty formulation of an indictment cannot require a reversal
of a conviction unless there is doubt as to the meaning of the in-
dictment."
It should be noted that the facts in that case showed a murder by
a gang of three committed during the perpetration of a robbery,
and that all three of the defendants had admitted their partici-
pation in the crime. The court undoubtedly was influenced in its
decision by the fear of the public criticism to which the three dis-
senting judges referred in their dissenting opinion, but the ma-
jority were careful to avoid making the decision a prece'dent to
be followed in less clear cases. Perhaps because of the strict
limitations placed upon its decision by the court, the statutory
forms are not in common use, at least in New York County.3
All discussion of future reform of the indictment, or of any
other suggested reform of criminal procedure, should concern it-
self primarily with the model code of criminal procedure promul-
gated by the American Law Institute in 1930,34 since the prestige
of the Institute, the extent to which its proposals have been
discussed by leading judges and practitioners, and the high repu-
tations of the reporters and their advisers, combined with the
evidence of careful study manifested by the commentaries ac-
companying the Code, furnish assurance that future programs for
reform will take the Code at least as the foundation on which
to build, even if they do not adopt its provisions in detail.
Chapter 6 of the Code, containing forty-seven sections, is de-
voted to the regulation of indictments and informations. In so
far as these provisions provide for the elimination of needless
technicalities of the common law rules regarding criminal pleading,
they are above criticism. The best experience of the several
states has been gathered together in a very complete and detailed
specification of needless requirements, the elimination of which.
from the accusation is expressly authorized, and there is a very
broad general section dealing with defects, variances and amend-
ments which, if accorded its reasonable scope, will prevent the
freeing of accused or convicted persons in all cases where it does
not appear affirmatively that the defendant was in fact prejudiced
thereby in his defense on the merits.
33Note, (1939) 53 Harv. L. Rev. 122.
34American Law Institute, Code of Criminal Procedure (1930) herein-
after referred to as "the Code."
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In the affirmative provisions as to what tile indictment shall
contain, 35 and in the suggested forms for indictments,3 the Code
adopts the method of reducing the indictment itself to the least
possible scope, and providing that its function as a pleading
shall largely be performed by a bill of particulars which the
court may require the prosecuting attorney to file in any case,
and which must be filed in all cases where demanded by the de-
fendant. The commentary to sec. 155 providing for the bill of
particulars is joined with that on the preceding section provid-
ing the general essentials of an indictment or information. This
commentary 37 summarizes the several state constitutional pro-
visions, securing to the accused the right to have the nature of
the accusation against him stated, but makes no reference to the
guaranty of the right to an indictment by the grand jury, whether
because those provisions are referred to in a previous commen-
tary,3" or because those provisions were not thought to be germane
to these sections, does not appear. The only discussion of the
bill of particulars as such in the commentary"-" deals with the
Massachusetts statute, which is substantially the same as the
provisions of the Code in this respect, and which has been held to
be valid.
The use of a bill of particulars to eliminate the necessity for a
specification of all of the elements of the crime charged seems,
therefore, to have been adopted with little previous experience.
The common law recognized the use of such a bill, granted in
the discretion of the judge when the indictment, verbose as it
was, might fail to give the defendant enough information as to
the nature of the crime to enable him properly to prepare his de-
fense,"0 but such a bill could only supplement the accusation in
35Secs. 152, 154.
SOSec. 187.
37Code, Commentaries, pp. 538-552.
3sCommentary to sec. 113, p. 414-431.
39Pp. 542, 543.
40Commonwealth v. Snelling. (1834) 15 Pick. (.Mass.) 321. 329 (order
requiring defendant to give particulars of proposed defenses to indictment
for libel sustained); 3 Encyc. P1. & Prac. 554. The Massachusetts court
said tl-at the need for bills of particulars was less in criminal thian in
civil 1-ec-au~e in the former the particulars were generally stated in the rec-
ord already, but there were some common law indictments that were not
sufficient. 3 Holdsworth, History of English Law (4th Ed. 1934) 618
finds the origin of the rules governing the contents of the indictment in
the old fo--nal requirements of the appeal for felony and in the analogy to
civil plearlings. The explanation, given currency by Hale. that it was in
favor of life and for the benefit of defendant, hardly accords with the rule
refusing a copy of the indictment to defendant. To attribute to the tuediaeval
judr-eq a purpose of giving protection to an unlearned defendant. who wa,
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the indictment; it could not supply the averments which the law
regarded as essential to a complete accusation of the crime
charged. It is astonishing to find so radical a change in our pro-
cedure 41 advocated by such a distinguished body without more
agitation for it in the discussions of the subject. An examination
of the indices to legal periodicals for the period from 1928 to
1937 inclusive reveals that in all the titles of the material listed
under the topic "Indictment and Information" a reference to a
bill of particulars appears only twice. It is true that most of the
discussions of short indictment statutes have some discussion of
the provision for a bill of particulars, but even in these discus-
sions there seems to be no clear statement of any benefits that
will result from stating the matter essential to the accusation of
a crime in two documents instead of in one. The discussions
almost all are devoted to the validity of the reform, assuming that
it is desirable. The chief advantages of stating the particulars of
a crime in a bill of particulars rather than in the indictment
itself would be a saving of labor if the defendant did not demand
a bill of particulars, as he probably would not in a great many
cases; facility of amendment; and greater scope for the applica-
tion of the doctrine of waiver and aider by verdict.4-2
The first of these apparent advantages is not a matter of very
great importance. The time required to draft even a common law
indictment for the ordinary felonies would be a very small frac-
tion of the time the prosecuting attorney is required to spend on
the entire prosecution. In the cases of prosecutions for such
modern statutory crimes as violations of the anti-trust acts, where
often the drafting of the indictment involves a great deal of care
and labor, it is probable that a bill of particulars would always
be demanded so that the saving of labor would again be small.
Since the bill of particulars is furnished by the prosecuting
attorney, and not by the grand jury, there would never be any
denied the right of counsel, by requiring the indictment to be phrased in
a complicated Latin form whose meaning must be grasped on hearing the
document read, is to deny possession of any intelligence. The explanation
of I-oldsworth makes the system logical, if not just. The protection of
the defendant against improper conviction was considered to be one of the
functions of the judge. But there is no question that the modern basis for
adhering to the old forms is almost always stated to be the requirement
that the defendant be informed of the exact charge against him.41
"The proposed Code . . . suggests a clear-cut departure from
the ancient indictment and information." Perk-ins, Short Indictments and
Informations, (1929) 15 A. B. A. J. 292. 293.
4-If the prosecution is begun by information, only the first of these
advantages would be present.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
necessity of referring to the grand jury for an amendment of it,
and thereby a great amount of time -would often be saved. But
the amendment, like the original bill, should be required to fall
within the limits of the particular acts which the grand jury had
found to constitute the crime charged and that requirement would
eliminate much of the chance for free amendment. It would cer-
tainly not be proper to permit an amendment at the trial to con-
form to the proof there adduced, if that proof differed from that
heard by the grand jury so that there was no finding by the
latter that defendant should be prosecuted for those particular acts.
Whether the courts would permit a substantially greater ap-
plication of the doctrines of waiver by defendant and cure by ver-
dict to allegations in the bill of particulars than they do with
respect to allegations in indictments is doubtful. If the defendant
cannot waive the requirement that the prosecution be instituted
by indictment,43 it would seem that he is equally incapable of
waiving any essential element of the indictment. Courts have
generally applied quite liberally the statutes providing for waiver
of formal defects, 44 but any failure to allege the existence of some
essential element of the crime, either by indictment or by bill of
particulars could not be waived. 45 The same principles would apply
to cure of defects in the indictment of verdict of guilty.
These very doubtful advantages from the use of two instru-
ments instead of one are greatly outweighed by the disadvantages.
In the first place, the practice is of very doubtful validity. It was
adopted in its modern scope in Massachusetts early enough to
give us a fairly extensive line of cases dealing with it. The earliest
statutes seem to have dealt with a few designated crimes and,
after those acts were held to be valid,46 the legislature adopted
the practice for all of the usual crimes. 4 None of these statutes
have been held to be invalid, but the attack on them has almost
43People ex rel. Battista v. Christian, (1929) 249 N. Y. 314, 164 N. I.
111. 61 A. L. R. 793; Comment, (1932) 30 Mich. L. Rev. 928.44 The numerous statutes referred to in Code, Commentary to sec.
184, 581-588 have been generally sustained when they are exl)ressly or by
construction limited to matters of form. 31 C. J. 874, notes 88, 89.
45Compare State v. Ostby, (1927) 203 Ia. 333, 210 N. W. 934, 212
N. W. 550. with State v. Delerno, (1856) 11 La. Ann. 648; Newcomb v.
State, (1859) 37 Miss. 383.
4rCommonwealth v. Bennett, (1875) 118 Mass. 443; Commonwealth v.
Dill, (1894) 160 Mass. 536, 36 N. E. 472.
47Commonwealth v. MacDonald, (1905) 187 Mass. 581, 73 N. E. 852;
Commonwealth v. Jordan, (1911) 207 Mass. 259, 93 N. E. 809, affirmed
225 U. S. 167, 32 Sup. Ct. 651, 56 L. Ed. 1038; Commonwealth v. Farmer.
(1914) 218 Mass. 507, 106 N. E. 150.
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always been based on the guaranty of a written accusation stating
the nature of the crime charged, rather than on the guaranty of
indictment by a grand jury, and the courts of Massachusetts have
not yet considered a case where there was a claim that the particu-
lars set forth by the prosecuting attorney in the bill of particulars
were not the same as those on which the grand jury based its
charge. If the prosecution cannot use its powers of amendment of
the indictment to conform to the proof in such a way as to make the
indictment refer to particular acts which did not appear to be
the basis of the original charge of the grand jury,48 it would seem
to be equally true that it cannot set out any particulars which
appear to differ from those on which the grand jury acted. The
New York court in its opinion49 sustaining a short form indictment
under its statute on the ground that the bill of particulars gave
the defendants the information they were entitled to as to the
nature of the acts constituting the crime, was careful to limit its
decision to the facts of that case where there was, and could be, no
claim that the acts set forth in the bill of particulars differed
from those on which the grand jury found the indictment.
The Iowa court has, likewise, sustained a statute adopting in
substance the provisions of the Code. In the first case in which
the question was raised,50 the objection to the validity of the
statute was based solely on the guaranty of the right to know the
nature and cause of the accusation. In the other,5' the statute
wag also alleged to violate the guaranty of indictment by a grand
jury, and the court relied on People v. Bogdanoff.5 - In neither
case was there any contention by counsel, or suggestion by the
court, that the bill of particulars did, or might, specify acts which
were not made the basis of the action of the grand jury in voting
the indictment. On the other hand, a strong argument has been
made that the provisions of the Code would conflict with the
guaranty of indictment by a grand jury in the fifth amendment
of the federal constitution, as that guaranty has been construed by
the courts of the United States.5 3 Thus, while it seems to be
pretty well settled that the function of the indictment as a pleading,
including information to the defendant of the nature and cause of
4sEx parte Bain, (1887) 121 U. S. 1, 7 Sup. Ct. 1, 30 L. Ed. 849.
See note 29, supra.49People v. Bogdanoff, (1930) 254 N. Y. 16, 171 N. E. 890.5oState v. Henderson, (1932) 215 Ia. 276, 243 N. W. 289.
51State v. Engler, (1933) 217 Ia. 138, 251 N. W. 88.
52(1930) 254 N. Y. 16, 171 N. E. 890.
53Comment, (1937) 35 Mich. L. Rev. 456.
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the accusation against him, can constitutionally be transferred
at least in part to a bill of particulars, furnished by the prosecut-
ing attorney, it is not so certain that its function of expressing the
finding of the grand jury as to the particular acts of defendant
which amounted to the crime charged can be so transferred.
Can the court constitutionally hold that the bill of partictilars
prima facie sets out the facts on which the grand jury acted.
especially in those jurisdictions which do not require the minutes
of the grand jury proceedings to be kept and made accessible to the
defendant?54 To do so would in many cases make the right of
the accused to have the grand jury pass on the question whether
he should be accused of certain specified acts a purely technical
one and thereby deprive him of the substance of the guaranty.
On the other hand, if we hold that the guaranty requires that the
state be able to prove in every case that the particulars set out in
the bill are the same as those on which the grand jury acted, we
clearly are introducing into many prosecutions a new question,
rather than eliminating any pre-existing one, and a question whose
solution will often involve an amount of time and effort out of all
proportion to the slight benefits that may accrue from the use of
the bill of particulars as a substitute for a specific charge in the
indictment.
But even if it be determined that the bill of particulars may be
used to perform this function of the grand jury indictment, the
wisdom of adopting that method is still not clear. On the face
of it, it seems to be absurd to simplify procedure by providing
that allegations which are essential to a record which will sustain
a conviction, shall be contained in two pleadings, instead of one as
formerly. This prima facie absurdity can be overcome only by a
clear showing that the separation of the allegations will result in
benefits that outweigh the manifest disadvantages necessarily in-
volved in the correlation of two distinct documents. The general
use of the practice in jurisdictions where there is a constitutional
guaranty of an indictment by a grand jury will inevitably lead to a
great many questions as to the identity of the charges in tile two
instruments, especially in those cases where the crime is a continu-
ing one, or one that has been repeated on different occasions. In
those cases the accused has a clear constitutional right to be tried
only for the particular acts of which the grand jury accused him
5 4Defendant has such access to the minutes in Iowa, See Comnment.
(1934) 19 Iowa L. Rev. 628.
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when the indictment was voted, and the determination of which
of several acts was made the basis of the charge will not be an easy
one. In jurisdictions wlere the short form of indictment, with a
bill of particulars granted to defendant as a matter of right, is
permitted by statutes which have been held valid, it is not a uniform
practice-for prosecuting attorneys to use that procedure. It was not
adopted by the Commonwealth in the prosecution of Sacco and
Vanzetti for murder in Massachusetts, a case where we might
suppose those in charge of the prosecution would be especially
careful in their procedure because of the widespread interest in
the case.53 It is not followed by the district attorney for New York
County in the drafting of model forms of indictments for use in
that office.5"
On all of these considerations, it would be better to eliminate
from any proposed reform of criminal procedure the Code pro-
visions for the use of the extreme short form of indictment, a form
which fails to conform to the minimum substantial requirements
of a constitutional indictment, when considered by itself alone.
The provision of the Code 7 that where the offense is one which
is divided into degrees, the indictment need only charge that de-
fendant committed the offense, without specifying the degree, is
another provision that does not appear to be in conformity with
the spirit of the constitutional guaranty of the right to an indict-
ment by a grand jury. In this provision, the Code is supported by
most of the cases,5s even where there is no statutory provision to
that effect.55 The reason most frequently given for this result is
that the indictment is sufficient at common law to charge that of-
fense and that the statute dividing the offense into separate degrees
merely affects the punishment, not the nature of the offense. But
55Commonwealth v. Sacco, (1926) 255 Mass. 412, 151 N. E. 839. The
indictment is not set out in the opinion, but the court, in commenting on
the motion for bill of particulars which was made but not ruled upon by
the trial court, stated the indictment was good as a common law indict-
ment and sufficient to apprise defendants of the nature of the charge with-
out a bill of particulars. The indictment is set out in Riddell. The Sacco-
Vanzetti Case from a Canadian Viewpoint, (1927) 13 A. B. A. J. 683.
where it is contrasted with the short form that would have been used
in Canada. There is no indication in the article that the author is aware
that the statutes of 'Massachusetts permitted the use of a form similar
to that of Canada.
56Note, Streamlining the Indictment, (1939) 53 Harv. L. Rev. 122.57Sec. 180.
5SSee, for examples, Graves v. State, (1883) 45 N. J. L. 203. affirmed
(1883) 45 N. J. L. 347, 46 Am. Rep. 778; State v. Cole, (1893) 132 N. C.
1069, 44 S. E. 391.
, 59The statutes on this subject are collected in Code, Commentary to
sec. 180, p. 579.
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in many cases it is largely a matter of accident whether the legisla-
ture chooses to modify the common law definition of a crime
and create a new offense which will include the acts eliminated
from the common law definition, or whether it will call the different
forms of the former offense different degrees of the same offense.
A rule which would say that in Minnesota, where sexual inter-
course with a girl under the age of consent is a separate statutory
crime known as carnal abuse of children," defendant is entitled
to have the indictment against him allege those facts as they are,
whereas in other jurisdictions where the same act is made a lower
degree of rape, an indictment need not give him that information,
is not one which would be easy to sustain in the minds of intelli-
gent laymen. Generally, the determination whether the different
acts constitute different offenses or different degrees of the same
offense depends on purely historical reasons. In most jurisdictions
there is much less difference in both legal consequences and moral
condemnation between the highest degree of manslaughter and the
lowest degree of murder, than there is between the different de-
grees of murder.61 If, as is frequently the case, the right to release
on bail depends on whether defendant is indicted for first or second
degree murder, a rule that a grand jury may use one form of in-
dictment for either permits the refusal of bail in cases where the
grand jury found that an accusation for first degree murder
would not be proper under the evidence. While most of the archaic
rules of the common law respecting indictment hamper the prose-
cution, and, therefore, the advocates of reform have directed their
attention primarily to the problem of making the prosecution more
effective, any consistent reform program should also eliminate
those few cases where the conservatism of the judges has per-
petuated rules unjust to defendants.
If this study of the problem of reform of the content of the
indictment is sound, it leads to the conclusion that any program
for reform of such content should begin with a survey of the
decisions of the particular jurisdiction construing the statutes
GoMason's Minn. 1927 Stats.. sec. 10,125.
-A-Mason's Minn. 1927 Stats., sec. 10-,070 defines third degree murder as
homicide by an act eminently dangerous to life and evincing a depraved
mind or in commission of a felony, and provides as punishment imprison-
ment for 7 to 30 years, as against life imprisomnent for first degree
murder. Sec. 10,074 defines manslaughter in the first degree as a killing
in the commission of a misdemeanor affecting the person or property of
another, or in the heat of passion by cruel or unusual means or the use of
a dangerous weapon, and sec. 10,077 provides that the latter crime shall be
punished by 5 to 20 years in the penitentiary. Thus it is possible to inflict
a heavier penalty for first degree manslaughter than for third degree nmurder.
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already in effect in that jurisdiction,62 and should adapt to the
needs of further enactment, to meet deficiencies revealed by such
a survey, the provisions of the Code governing the content of the
accusation, except in so far as those provisions are based on the
proposal to make the bill of particulars perform some of the
functions which have theretofore been regarded as those of the
indictment proper. It is not clear beyond controversy that forms
for indictments should be prescribed either by statute or rule of
court. The advantage of having an authoritative declaration that
a stated form is sufficient, may be offset by a tendency of the
courts to hold that, if the use of that form is attempted, there
must be a strict compliance with the stated language. If the
general requirements of an accusation are prescribed, a prosecut-
ing attorney should have little difficulty in drafting a charge to
meet his particular situation without involving any great degree
of danger that it will be held to be invalid.
But even if we succeed in adopting perfect provisions govern-
ing the contents of indictments and in prescribing forms which can
be adapted by prosecuting attorneys who have only ordinary
ability to perform their duties to meet the various situations that
may arise, we will not have eliminated the most serious grounds
for criticism of the law's technicalities, those based on the cases
where the defendant has been convicted of a crime, often a
heinous one, and'perhaps after a lengthy trial which has im-
posed a financial burden on the county and a burden of time on
those -who have had to participate in it, and where the conviction
is then set aside, either by the trial court on motion in arrest of
judgment, or more often by the appellate court, for some trivial
objection to the indictment which the defendant did not regard
as important enough to raise before the trial. Many of these
objections are based on mistakes which are purely typographical
or clerical errors."3 While the opportunity for such errors will be
reduced by the shorter form at least in the proportion by which
the length of the instrument is reduced, it is inevitable that such
errors will occur, and any program for procedural reform should
62-An ideal illustration of such a study is Perkins, Abridged Indict-
ments and Informations, (1927) 12 Iowa L. Rev. 209. Professor Perkins
became one of the Advisers to the Reporters of the Code after the chapter
on indictments and informations was drafted according to the title page of
the Code, but he supported the provisions of that chapter in his article on
Short Indictments and Informations, (1929) 15 A. B. A. J. 292. The district
attorney of New York County has performed a similar task for New York.
Note, Streamlining the Indictment, (1939) 53 Harv. L. Rev. 192.63See the cases discussed by Caruso, The Short Indictment, (1935) 23
Ky. L. J. 362; Missouri Crime Survey, (1926) 245.
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undertake to minimize the effect of such errors to the greatest
extent possible. At common law objection to the sufficiency of
the indictment could be raised before trial either by demurrer or
by motion to quash, and after trial by motion in arrest of judg-
ment. Since the demurrer had in criminal cases, as in civil cases,
the effect of a conclusive admission of the truth of the facts well
pleaded, so that if it was overruled the court could immediately
pronounce final judgment and sentence, it was very little used.
As long as defendant was not permitted to see the indictment
and only heard it on his arraignment, and was then not repre-
sented by counsel, there was very little opportunity for the motion
to quash. Perhaps for this reason, the courts were very lenient
in permitting objections to the indictment to be first raised after
verdict of guilty by the motion in arrest of judgment, at which time
he might be for the first time advised by counsel. This practice is
expressly preserved in Texas by a statute which provides that the
motion in arrest of judgment shall be granted upon any ground
which may be good as an exception to the indictment for any
substantial defect therein. 4 But in most jurisdictions there are
statutes which purport to limit the scope of attack upon the indict-
ment by motion in arrest of judgment," and in three states it
seems to be the statutory rule that the judgment cannot be arrested
even for the failure of the indictment to charge an offense. °0 In
addition to these formal pleadings to raise objections to the
sufficiency of the indictment, it is sometimes the practice to raise
them at the trial, after the jury has been sworn by motion,07 or by
objection to the introduction of any evidence on the ground that
the indictment does not charge any offense.
The Code makes no mention of demurrers to the indictment,
nor of objections to evidence because of defects in the indict-
ment, but it does provide for motions to quash before trial', and
for motions in arrest of judgment after trial. 9 One of the grounds
for either motion is that the indictment does not charge the com-
mission of an offense. Any restriction upon the common law
04Tex. Rev. Cr. Stat. 1925, Cr. Pr. Art. 763. The following article
provides that no judgment shall be arrested for want of form, but fre-
quently these typographical and clerical errors, if they cannot be corrccted
or disregarded, make the indictment defective in substance, not merely in
form.
-
5Code, Commentary to sec. 369. pp. 1071-1076.
66'Maryland, Massachusetts and Rhode Island.
67It was so raised, apparently for the first time, in the case in which
the New York short-form act was held valid. People v. Bogdanoff, (1930)
254 N. Y. 16, 171 N. E. 890.
"sCode, sec. 210.
69Code, sec. 369.
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rules as to the kind of defects that may be taken advantage of
upon either motion must be read into the provision from other
sections. In view of the long history of the practice of permitting
a wide range of objections to be urged on the motion in arrest
of judgment, and of the gross miscarriage of justice which so
frequently results when a convicted man is able to escape punish-
ment by raising a technical objection to the indictment for tile
first time after the verdict has been rendered,70 it would be wise to
limit the broad ground of attack on the indictment by motion in
arrest of judgment expressly to those objections which have not
been waived or cured by the verdict. Though the Code has broad
provisions limiting the nature of defects which will invalidate
indictments and providing for the amendment thereof,-' it appar-
ently makes no provision for waiver of objections or cure by
verdict.72 It does provide that failure to move to quash shall be a
waiver of all grounds of a motion to quash except those which are
also ground for a motion in arrest of judgment, but that section
can have no effect on objections to the sufficiency of the indict-
ment, since any basis for attack on the indictment by motion to
quash may also be made the basis of a motion in arrest of judg-
ment.
There are cogent reasons why the requirements necessary to
sustain an indictment against an attack made before the case goes
to trial should be more strict than those necessary to sustain it
against an attack made first at or after the trial. In the first place,
the effect on the efficient administration of criminal justice in the
-case of the successful attack before trial is very much less than if
the attack is successfully made after trial. In the former case,
the most serious consequence that can follow is the resubmission
of the evidence to another grand jury for a new indictment. If
the grand jury which found the indictment is still in session, it can
amend the indictment without hearing the evidence again. In the
second place, the attack before trial is more apt to be based on a
real opinion of defendant or his counsel that the defect will
7OThe objection that the indictment concluded "against the peace and
dignity of the State of W. [instead of "West"] Virginia," was first made
after trial and sustained. Lemons v. State, (1870) 4 W. Va. 755.
73Code, secs. 184 (1), (2).
72Code, sec. 184 (4) provides that no motion made after verdict based
on any defect in the indictment shall be sustained unless it is affirmatively
shown that the defendant was in fact prejudiced thereby in his defense upon
the merits; but that allows the court no more latitude to sustain a motion
in arrest of judgment than it would have to sustain a motion to quash for a
similar defect, when the indictment or bill of particulars could be amended
without harm to the prosecution, unless defendant is granted a continuancc
under sec. 184 (3) because the defect prejudiced his defense.
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prejudice him in making his defense. Studies of the operation
of our present system of criminal procedure show that attacks on
indictments before trial are rare. 3 If the defendant is held in jail,
he is generally as anxious as the prosecution for an early trial and
will not file a motion to quash which will result in delaying the
trial unless he thinks that thereby he will obtain an advantage
great enough to offset the delay. If he is out on bail, but thinks
that he has a good chance of winning a verdict of acquittal, lie is
also generally anxious to have the trial over with so that he may
be freed of the charge hanging over him. The relatively small
number of cases where the defendant has no hope of acquittal,
and ample funds to enable him to resort to delay in the hope of
wearing out the prosecution, should not cause the adoption of a
rule which may sometimes deprive the defendant of information
which is of value to him in preparing his defense, and to which
he is entitled under the common law and the constitution.
But these reasons do not apply with anything like the same
force to objections which are made after the case goes to trial.
The defendant is, or may be, in all cases represented by counsel
and is furnished with a copy of the indictment. If lie prefers to
plead to the indictment as drawn rather than to make specific
objection to it, the law accords him that privilege, but lie ought
not thereafter to expect the court to say that he was mistaken
in his choice, that he was prejudiced by the defects he thereafter
points out in the indictment. Certainly, after the trial has begun,
there is no reason favoring the objection that compares with the
social injustice that results from nullifying expensive and laborious
proceedings that have been undertaken and often carried through
on the strength of defendant's apparent satisfaction with the
charge. Any rule of procedure on this subject ought to provide
that failure to raise an objection before trial operates as a waiver
of all objections that constitutionally can be waived.
Many courts have been unnecessarily strict in limiting the
objections that can constitutionally be waived. Any right that is
given for the defendant's own protection, he ought to be permitted
to waive, but many courts have held otherwise. The present
tendency seems to be to permit a more liberal application of the
doctrine of waiver to constitutional rights.
7 4
73Illinois Crime Survey (1929) 211; Missouri Crime Survey (1926)
167; supra, notes 7, 9.
74See, for example, cases dealing with waiver of right to trial by jury.
Code, Commentaries to sec. 266, p. 810.
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The guaranty of indictment by grand jury is not stated in the
form of a right granted to the defendant, but of a prohibition of
action by the court until there has been such an indictment, and
such indictment has, therefore, been held to be a jurisdictional re-
quirement, 75 and it is fundamental that a party cannot confer
jurisdiction on the court by waiving an objection that would de-
feat such jurisdiction. But it does not necessarily follow from the
principle that an indictment is essential to the court's jurisdiction,
that the defendant cannot waive any objections to it except those
which are purely formal. When a motion is made to quash the
indictment for defects therein, the only proceedings from which
the court can determine whether there has been an indictment by a
grand jury charging the particular acts which constitute a crime
over which the court has jurisdiction is the indictment itself.
After the trial, the court has, in addition, the acceptance of the
indictment by the defendant and often much evidence received
at the trial which- identifies the crime as that for which the indict-
ment was found. There is no reason why the court may not take
this additional material into account in determining whether there
was an actual indictment by the grand jury charging the particular
crime for which the defendant was subsequently convicted. To do
so, is not to say that the parties can confer jurisdiction on the
court, but merely that a jurisdiction that always existed in fact,
but which was not properly established by the record in the begin-
ning, has now been' established by subsequent proceedings had with
defendant's consent, so that the court may now disregard omis-
sions from the indictment which havd been supplied by the later
proceedings. It, therefore, ought to be permissible to adopt a valid
statute or rule to the effect that defendant's failure to object to
the indictment before trial should operate as a waiver of any
objections that the indictment failed to give him sufficient infor-
mation as to the offense charged, and also waiver of all objections
that it failed to show a finding by the grand jury that he should
be prosecuted for the particular acts constituting the crime for
which he was convicted, if the subsequent proceedings in the case
enabled the court to determine that the grand jury had in fact in-
tended to charge the commission of those acts.
The provision of the Code that no variance between the allega-
tions of the indictment -and the evidence in support thereof shall
be a ground for acquittal, but that the indictment may be amended
75People ex rel. Battista v. Christian, (1929) 249 N. Y. 314, 164 N. E.
111, 61 A. L. R. 793.
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to conform to the eviddnce, quite clearly violates the constitu-
tional guaranty in all of those cases where there is nothing to
show that the grand jury had in mind in finding the indictment
the facts as they appeared'by the evidence at the trial, rather than
those they stated in the indictment. It should be qualified so as
to eliminate those cases.
The result of this study may be summarized as follows:
(1) The indictment by grand jury incorporated in our consti-
tutional guaranties contemplates that the formal document re-
turned into court shall perform the functions of expressing the
finding of the grand jury that the evidence heard by it warrants
the state in placing the defendant on trial for the specified crime.
committed by the particular acts set forth therein; and of the
initial pleading of the prosecution in the case by informing the
court of the crime charged so as to enable the court to determine
that it has jurisdiction, and by informing the defendant of the
nature of the accusation against him to enable him to prepare lii';
defense.
(2) That these functions can better be performed by a single
indictment, than by a combined indictment and bill of particulars.
(3) That modern criminal procedure should provide for the
plainest and simplest language which will secure the performance
of these functions, and for the most liberal amendments that are
possible under the constructions placed on the applicable constitu-
tional provisions, so long as those amendments do not change the
charge to one which the grand jury had not voted in finding the
indictment.
(4) That the greatest evil connected with existing rules as to
the validity of indictments is that they permit defendants to specu-
late on the verdict, and, if they are found guilty, then permits
them to escape the consequences by raising for the first time objec-
tions to the indictment; and that it should be provided that failure
to object to the indictment before trial shall operate as a waiver of
all objections to the indictment so far as such waiver is constitu-
tionally permissible, and that the constitutional guaranty should,
for this purpose, be construed to create a privilege for defendant
which he may waive, except in so far as it may affirmatively
appear that the defendant was convicted of a crime other than that
of which he was accused by the grand jury.
76Code, sec. 184 (2).
